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Relations between major powers can be described as shifting between universalism and particularism. In periods
of universalism, major powers try to work out acceptable rules of behavior among one another, whereas in
periods of particularism, they emphasize special interests of special powers. The way historians see shifts in
major power relations since 1816 largely follows such a classification. By comparing the policies pursued during
four periods of universalism and four periods of particularism, as well as analysing what ended or initiated such
periods, the limits of major power universalism can be evaluated. Particularly, the short-comings of the recent
period of detente are illuminated. Also some principles for a more enduring form of universalism are suggested.
1. Universalism vs. particularism
Autonomy has been a most cherished value for
major powers throughout history. It has been
a motivating force for smaller powers to free
themselves from the influence of others. Libera-
tion has been the ambition of revolutionaries.
Still, at no time has autonomy been more
restrained than today, even for the major
powers. Nuclear threats and strategic doctrines
link even the most powerful to one another and
restrict the space for independent action. In
spite of nuclear vulnerability, major powers can
pursue policies to further their particularist
interest as witnessed in Eastern Europe, West
Asia or Central America. Also, they may pursue
policies of universalist application, taking
into account legitimate interests of others as
witnessed during the period of detente. In this
sense, nothing is new. Similar options have
always been available to major powers, and,
at some period in time, universalism has been
preferred to particularism. This study analyses
experiences of major power universalism as
opposed to particularism: what has historically
been the difference, what has been the result,
why have policies shifted and which lessons
can be drawn?
Universalist policies are understood to be
concerted efforts among major powers to
organize relations between themselves to work
out acceptable rules of behavior (general
standards). Particularist policies, in contrast,
are understood to be policies which emphasize
the special interest of a given power, even at
the price of disrupting existing organizations
or power relationship.’ In the first case, the
aim is order, but this is not to say that order
is the result or that disorder necessarily follows
from the other. On the contrary, some would
argue that the pursuit of self-interest is creating
more order than is altruism, as it redirects
imbalances in power distribution and makes
possible the voicing of grievances. Thus, it is
for the historical record to decide whether
universalism or particularism results in war.
This formulation of the problem is hardly
novel or original, but still there have been
few efforts to systematically compare the
outcome of the different set of policies. Under
the concept of world order fruitful incursions
into the area have been made by the Institute
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for World Order, as well as by scholars like
Stanley Hoffmann.2 The conceptions might
be different, but mostly they point in a similar
direction: world order policies aim at including
more than the particularistic interest of a given
actor as the actor’s goals. There is, in other
words, a more universalistic ambition. Apart
from preserving the actor itself as an actor,
there is also an understanding of the demands
and worries of the opponent. Obviously, the
structural framework in which such globalistic
policies are carried out differ; the Institute for
World Order in general wants to go beyond the
nation-state, and develop policies more fitting
for local (’smaller’) actors, whereas the
Hoffmann conception clearly focuses on the
role of the major powers. Here it suffices to
note that the structure of the global system
makes it necessary to point to the significance
of the major powers and their mutual relations.
It is also evident that mutual relations between
these powers tend to undergo dramatic shifts
and changes, swinging between more univer-
salistic and more particularistic emphases.
Thus, major powers pursuing universalistic
policies would, for some, be world order
policies. For others, this might still be un-
satisfactory if the basic question is policies
by whom? It is self-evident that there are
limits to universalism of the major powers.
Their status as major is not to be threatened.
On the contrary it constitutes the postulate of
their policies. Thus, at some point, the divergent
definitions of world order also become in-
compatible, boiling down to the question of
whether, in the long-run, major powers are to
remain majors or not.
Individual actors can have individual orders
of preference and priorities can change over
time. However, we are interested in the col-
lectivity of major powers. General standards
are general only to the extent they have support
from many actors. Major powers are significant
in setting such standards and in achieving
adherence to them. Thus, if a collectivity
of major powers, tacitly or openly, sets .up
certain rules of behavior and applies them
consistently over time, this will have an effect
beyond the collectivity. If, on the contrary,
there are no such agreed rules, particularism
is likely to become a predominant pattern.
Here the focus is on comparing periods of
collective major power universalism, and on
contrasting them to periods of predominant
particularism. Historical experiences of
universalism can give insight into useful
methods, but also into the limits of such
efforts. The study of particularism might
yield knowledge of legitimate dissatisfaction
with existing arrangements. I f a given - formal
or informal - collective arrangement con-
stantly works to the advantage of some and
to the disadvantage of others, the arrangement
itself becomes questioned.
2. Identifying universalism and particularism
Since the Napoleonic era, there have been
several serious attempts at creating universalist
relations among major powers. These attempts,
initiated by major powers, have built on the
consent of all or most major powers. They
have sometimes been constructed around
particular organizations (such as the League
of Nations) or around more informal arrange-
ments (such as the Concert of Europe).
Common to them is the ambition to develop
general rules of behavior among the major
powers, and attempts to reconcile differences
so as to maintain the consensus among the
involved powers. Thus, what historians refer
to as periods of concerts, orders, or detente,
is what we here label universalism. Such periods
are delimited on two grounds. First, there
has to be a certain consistency and continuity
in the policies pursued by the major powers
within the particular period. Secondly, there
has to be a marked difference (qualitative
break) between these policies and those in the
following period. The analysis, in other words,
has a double task: to find the consistent
elements within a given period and to find the
important factors contributing to the qualitative
change in relations.
Table I reproduces eight periods of universalist
and particularist policies among major powers
since the Napoleonic age. The periodization
is drawn from customary historical writing.
The organizing principle is that of policy.
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Table 1. Universalism and Particularism, 1816-1976. Periodil.ation of Relations among Major Powers.
Note: Major Power definitions follows the usual (’orrelates of War practice. (See Small & Singer 1982, pp. 44-45.) >
The periods are separated with respect to the
existence or non-existence of a consistent
effort among the major powers to pursue
universalist ambitions. These periods are our
units of analysis in the following.3 3
Table I gives some characteristics of each of
the periods, at the same time explaining the
var ious delimitations. However, some com-
ments are necessary. The European Concert
of 1816-1848 is recognized by historians as
a period of its own, centered on the activities
of the Austrian Chancellor Metternich, but
involving all the major European powers. The
revolutions of 1848, rather than those of 1830,
are seen to mean the ending of this period.
The following period was one exhibiting many
of the marks of particularism, as we have
defined it. Several countries were, in this period,
pursuing more limited ambitions (notably
unification and aggrandizement). Thus, in
the writings of historians, also this period
stands out clearly.
The following two periods are more difficult
to separate. Bismarck’s policy had a universalist
coloring, where the definition of Germany’s
interest was not equated with the expansion
of the Reich, but rather the establishment
of a workable relationship, cementing what
had already been gained. Germany, then, was
a central force in this attempt at universalist
construction. Following the downfall of
Bismarck, and the rise of a more daring political
leadership in Germany, the situation changed
during the 1890s. The exact dating might be
hard to pinpoint, but the difference is there.
Here it has been set as 1895, but that is an
approximation. It should be noted that also
other, non-European countries, at this time,
began to pursue particularistic interests
(United States and Japan).
The organization created after the First
World War was a more conscious attempt to
work out constructive relations among the
majors, this time centering on France and
Britain. However, the universalism was
incomplete, a great number of countries were
not involved or supportive of these attempts,
and with Hitler’s taking of power in 1933,
the arrangement rapidly fell apart. Finally,
following the Second World War, the alliance
between the victors, containing a potential
for universalist relations, was quickly changed
into a severe confrontation. Not until after
the Cuban missile crisis did a period of more
constructive relations emerge.
This means that our analysis will concentrate
on eight periods, four of each type. It is
interesting to note, from Table 1, that there is
more consensus among historians on the
labelling of periods of universalism. The
particularist periods are not dominated by
one overarching ambition, and consequently,
the naming becomes problematic. There is,
however, one exception to that, the period
1945-1962. The bipolarization of the con-
frontation between the United States and the
Soviet Union has given it one customary label.
Universalism in this bipolar world has, how-
ever, attracted two different conceptions, sug-
gesting that there might, at this time, be more
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Stable 11. Wars and Military Confrontations Involving Major Powers, in Universalist and Particularist Periods, i816-t9’16.
Source: Wars: Small & Singer (1982). Military Confrontations: Data from the Correlates of War project, 1980.
agreement about conflict than about colla-
boration.
The fact that the periods in general appear
to become shorter, and. that the universalist
periods are smaller relative to the particularist
ones, might be indicative of a general rise in
confrontation among major powers. The
development of conflict behavior in the
different periods can be seen more closely
in Table II.
Table II shows a different pattern for the two
sets of policies. There are no major-major
wars reported in the periods of universalism,
whereas all the major-major wars are to be
found in periods of particularism. This
observation should be treated cautiously,
however, as it could be affected by the labelling.
Historians might be quicker to find an orderly
pattern in periods without major power wars,
and thus we would face a tautology. It might,
however, also suggest that universalist policies
are successful, at least with respect to major
power relations. As the ambition is to develop
constructive relations, and as a dominant
group among the majors agree on this, major
power war could be avoided. An indication
is that no periods of universalism end with
the outbreak of a major power war. Rather,
such wars come way into a period of particula-
rism.4
Furthermore, it could be noted in Table
II that there is some conflict behavior recorded
in all other categories. One third of all major
power confrontations have taken place in
periods of universalism. This might mean that
such periods have witnessed a somewhat greater
ability to cope with confrontation than have
periods of particularism: none escalated into
a major war. With respect to major-minor con-
frontations, fewer escalated into war in periods
of universalism than in periods of particularism.
The ratio of wars to confrontation (a rough
measure of escalation) for all categories shows
a lower frequency of war per confrontation
in periods of universalism. This reinforces,
although does not prove, the thesis that major
power policies have a significant bearing on
the chances for war. If such relations are
couched in a cooperative, constructive fashion,
the danger of war might decrease.
Many of the typical structural traits that
often are pointed to in order to explain
differences will not help in discriminating
between these periods; often the same countries
found themselves involved in both. The five
states making up the Concert of Europe are
also those involved in the following, more
tumultuous period. Similarly, the countries
setting up the League in 1919 are also those
confronted with German challenges in the
1930s. The actors of the global competition
after World War II, from 1963 onward,
attempted to work out an orderly relationship.
Thus, it appears more promising to relate such
changes to short-term variations rather than
to lasting properties of the global system.
Let us only note that as none of the four
periods of universalism have lasted, but
all have been transformed into periods of
particularism, the inadequacies of the policies
pursued need to be specified. The shifts and
changes obviously give food for thought to
the pessimist as well as to the optimist: no
period of universalism has lasted, but neither
has a period of particularism.
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3. Universalism and particularism in practice
The strongly different outcomes of periods
of universalism and particularism make a
closer scrutiny important. Thus, we ask what
the differences in policy consist of. The eight
periods of major power relations differ from
one another in many ways. The economic
conditions, the reach of weapons, the speed
of communication, the ideological framework
have greatly changed over time. Thus, the
periods are comparable in some respects but
not in others. A comparison over time becomes
less comprehensive the longer the time span
applied. In this case, it means that con-
siderable detail is lost in the search for general
phenomena. Still, a general observation, such
as the shifts in the predominant pattern of
policy, could be expected to be associated
with a general explanation. In this light we
attempt to search for discriminating patterns
of policies in some admittedly limited, but
still crucial areas.
First, Table II suggests a difference in
symmetric and asymmetric relations: major
powers might approach one another differently
from how they approach non-majors at the
same time. Thus, we will compare the ex-
periences of universalism and particularism
in both these relationships. Second, the analysis
employs a framework of four sets of policy,
introduced in earlier work: Geopolitik,
Realpolitik, Idealpolitik and Kapitalpolitik. 5
Geopolitik is, in particular, concerned with the
geographical conditions: contiguity and ways
to handle contiguity, as well as control over
distant (from the point of view of core
countries) territories. Realpolitik emphasizes
military capability, arms build-up of particular
countries and the formation of alliances. Ideal-
politik concerns the handling of nationalistic
or ideological disputes, ranging from mes-
sianism to neutrality with respect to such
issues, whereas Kapitalpolitik refers to the
economic capabilities and interactions among
states.
The difference between the two patterns in
Geopolitik terms can be seen in the different
policies pursued in the ’core’ areas, in territories
particularly close or militarily significant to
the major powers. During several periods of
universalism, conscious attempts were made
to separate the parties geographically, thus
attempting to reduce the fear of attack or
the danger of provocation. The creation of
buffer zones was a particularly pronounced
effort, for instance, in relation to France after
1814 or Germany after 1918. In times of
particularism, policies were reversed: the buffer
zones were perceived as dangerous areas of
’vacuum’, making majors compete for control.
Examples are the Prussian expansion into
Central Europe in the 1850s and the 1860s and
Germany’s invasion of demilitarized zones
or neighboring countries during the 1930s.
Also, following the Second World War, the
United States as well as the Soviet Union
tried to secure as much territory as possible
before and after the German and Japanese
capitulations. Indeed, in the 1945-1962 period,
’free’ territory was equally disliked on both
sides, neither being willing to accept neutrality
or neutralism, for instance. In the periods
1870-1895 and 1963-1975 such basic arrange-
ments were left intact, keeping the parties
at close geographical confrontation, but at the
same time other measures were instituted to
somewhat reduce the fear of attack from the
opponent (e.g. confidence-building measures
in the latter period). Compared to earlier
experiences of universalism, these periods saw
less of such attempts, however.6
Looking at the major-minor relations, the
patterns are less clear-cut. Although the
expectation might be for ’softer’ attitudes
during periods of universalism, this appears
not to be born out. Rather, during periods
of universalism, major powers tried to establish
or extend control, as in periods of particularism.
Perhaps there is a discernable trend of greater
major power collaboration during the former
than during the latter. Thus, the colonization
of Africa took place largely during a period
of universalism, and partly this process was
mutually agreed on by the major powers
themselves (notably the Berlin Congress in
1884-1885). Similarly, British and French
control were extended into Arab countries
during such periods, during the 1880s as well
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as in the 1920s. It is, furthermore, interesting
to observe that the decolonization process
was initiated during a period of confrontation
between the major powers. The peak year of
African independence, 1960, coincided with
particularly tense times in American-Soviet
relations (e.g. the aborted Paris summit meeting
and the U-2 affair).
Realpolitik concerns itself with military
power and alliance patterns. In periods of
universalism, we would expect less emphasis
to be put on military armaments, while greater
efforts would go into diplomatic means to
work out major power relations. Studying the
four periods, this is clearly true for three, but
not for the fourth one (1963-1976). Conversely,
the periods of particularist policies would
exhibit a more rapid arms build-up among
the majors. Again, this is true for three out
of four periods, the exception being the 1849-
1870 period. Partly, this might reflect an
important inter-century difference: during the
19th century, the institutionalized pressures
for arms build-up did not exist to the same
degree that has been true for the 20th century.
With respect to the nuclear age, the patterns
are somewhat surprising. In terms of military
expenditures, the increase seems less striking
during the 1950s than during the 1960s or 1970s,
for the United States and the Soviet Union.
In terms of the amassing of nuclear arsenals,
however, there is a continuous increase for
both sides.7 Again, the 1963-1976 period does
not follow the pattern of previous universalist
periods.
Most periods of universalism seem associated
with a loose alliance system. The exception is
the 1963-1976 period, but also in this period
there are some elements of a loosening-up
of the system (notably the withdrawal of France
from military cooperation in NATO, and
Rumania taking a special position within the
Warsaw Pact). However, also particularism
could go well with a loose alliance pattern,
as alliances might restrain rather than give
freedom to a given actor. Three periods of
particularism showed fairly tight alliance
patterns, but in one of these (1933-1945) not
all powers were involved in the alliance con-
figurations. In one, the 1849-1870 period, loose
alliances served the particularist ambitions
well.
There is an interesting trade off between
alliance patterns and arms build-up. In a sense,
one reason for entering into an alliance is to
reduce the need for armaments. In this way,
a major power can increase its military strength,
at a lower cost and at a faster rate than otherwise
would have been possible. This, then, favors
the emergence of loose alliance patterns, and
thus makes it plausible that universalism as
well as particularism might be associated
with such a pattern. On the other hand, if the
alliances are closely knit, and the option of
withdrawing or switching is not available, the
only way to increase the strength for a given
actor and for the alliance as a whole is through
arms build-ups. Thus, in bipolarized situations
with ’permanent’ alliances, arms races become
a more likely outcome. The few examples
available of such situations indeed suggest
this to be the case (1895-1918, 1933-1945 and
the post-1945 periods).
Armaments and alliance patterns largely
concern the relations between major powers.
We would expect Realpolitik policies in major-
minor relations to be less different for the two
patterns. Thus, it is noteworthy that, in Table
II above, universalist periods have also been
periods of extensive major power involvement
in major-minor disputes. If we take into
account the length of the periods and the
number of majors, we find that the majors, in
fact, during such periods are heavily con-
cerned with minors.
With respect to Idealpolitik, universalist
policies would be less chauvinistic and less
messianic among majors than particularism.
Earlier it has been demonstrated that Ideal-
politik contradictions correlate with wars
and confrontations among major powers for
the entire epoch (Wallensteen 1981), but we
now expect a pattern of shifting periods. It is
probably enough to have one major displaying
messianism in a given period to upset all
relations. This expectation is well borne out:
the four universalist periods show very little
of either of these types of Idealpolitik, whereas,
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in each of the four particularist periods,
there was at least one major power pursuing
such a policy. Chauvinism certainly was part
of the German unification policy during
Bismarck, as was French renaissance during
Napoleon III, both appearing in the same
1849-1870 period. The policies of Wilhelm
II and of Hitler are typical examples. In the
1945-1962 period too there was a strong element
of messianism, for very different reasons than
previous ones, in Soviet as well as American
postures.
In their relations to minor powers, the majors
have often been less constrained, also in times
of universalism. Thus, in the Concert of Europe
period, majors did not hesitate to intervene
against changes in minor countries going
against the convictions held by the major.
In the 1870-1895 period, this might have been
less marked, as this to a large degree was
a period of parallel nationalism, as well as
in the period of the League of Nations. In the
detente period, however, the reluctance among
the majors to accept dissent within areas of their
domination has drawn increasing tension, also
among the majors. Thus, the Soviet invasion
of Czechoslovakia significantly affected the
formulation of detente policies. The American
warfare in Vietnam seems to have slowed down
the pace of collaboration between the two
superpowers. Thus, a policy of coexistence
between the majors also might require the
acceptance of coexistence between different
social forms in major-minor relations.
As to Kapitalpolitik patterns, there are
some interesting divergencies, necessitating a
lengthier discussion. Universalism would here
refer to a policy that attempts to be more
inclusive, such as setting up of a joint inter-
national regime for economic affairs, or ex-
tending trade, investment or capital flows
in an equitable way among the major powers.
Particularist policies, on the contrary, would
be those that aim at self-reliance, autarchy or
exclusion from ties with other countries.
Taken in this way, there seems to be little
relationship between the universalist policies
described previously and economic relations.
Thus, in the period of the European Concert,
introvert policies or policies of exclusion seem
to have been the predominant pattern. Free
trade actually cannot be dated until the end
of this very period, with the repeal of the
Corn Laws in Britain in 1846. The following
period, then, is one of a more ambitious
attempt at spreading international trade,
pressing for free trade. An important break-
through was the Anglo-French Treaty of
1860, during a period which, in terms of
other affairs, is most appropriately described
as a particularist one. Prussia and the German
Customs Union followed in this period, to
return to high tariff policies only in the next
period, in 1879. Thus, this universalist period
is characterized by a retreat from free trade,
rather than the reverse (Kindleberger 1978).
In the period of particularism leading to
the First World War, the growth of international
trade was strong, but it appears that it also
to a larger degree took place within the colonial
empires (Kindleberger 1964). Thus, in this
period, there might have been a closer cor-
respondence with particularism. The same is
true for the post-World War I periods, the
universalist period being one of increasing
international interdependence, followed after
the Great Depression with increasing attempts
at withdrawing from the international economic
exchanges.
Also, in the post-1945 periods, there is a
correspondence between the economic policies
and other policies. Thus, for the first,
particularist period, the West clearly expanded
free trade within its area, but consciously
tried to exclude the Soviet bloc from trade
(e.g. the strategic embargo). Such policies
were partially reversed with the onset of
detente, symbolized by the first major grain
deal between the United States and the Soviet
Union in 1963. In US-Soviet as well as in West
European-East European relations, the develop-
ment of economic relations was strongly
favored by the political leadership.9
Thus, we find that in several of the periods
there has been a close correspondence between
increasing economic interaction and univer-
salism, but that this is perhaps more pronounced
for the periods after 1895 than before. In
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Table Ill. Typical Policies in Periods of Universalism and Particularism, 1816-1976.
Periods are the unit of analysis. In parenthesis: periods departing from the overall pattern. Few systematic differences
concern direct major-minor relations.
periods of particularism, however, policies of
economic bloc-building or economic autarchy
have been preferred. The closer correspondence
between these sets of policies in the 20th century
might suggest closer coordination of inter-
national interaction than previously was the
case. Political-strategic conditions seem in-
creasingly to have colored economic relation-
ship.
Table III shows that the policies pursued
in different areas have been designed to
support one another, and on the whole, few
contradictions or inconsistencies are to be
reported. Thus, periods of universalism have
generally involved attempts at separation of
majors through buffer zone arrangements or
self-imposed restraint in vital areas. Pre-
dominantly a pattern of slow arms build-
ups and loose alliances has been pursued.
Ideologically, a policy of coexistence has-
prevailed and economically, trade has been
extended among the dominant countries.
Taken together, this means that the concept
of ’universalism’ summarizes consistent efforts
among many major powers, working in the
same direction of building constructive and
multi-dimensional relations. We have already
observed, in Table II, that in such periods
the incidence of war and confrontation among
major powers is lower.
The patterns displayed in periods of
particularism are in sharp contrast. Buffer
zone arrangements have been overturned, less
restraint has been exhibited in vital areas,
rapid arms build-ups have occurred and solid,
internationally binding alliances have been
formed. Among at least some of the majors,
messianism/chauvinism has been prevalent,
and trade has been used as an instrument for
coercion or exclusion. Again this is a pattern
of internally consistent policies, all rein-
forcing the underlying conflict between
major powers. Indeed, as we have already
noted, periods of particularism are also
periods with major power wars and military
confrontations.
However, there are some notable incon-
sistencies in these patterns. Most exceptional
is the 1849-1870 period: in several ways it had
traits also typical for the periods immediately
preceding or succeeding: loose alliance
structures and little arms build-up, apart
from the time immediately before a major war.
Thus, in these respects, there is considerable
intra-19th century similarity. Also, with
respect to economic relations, this period
was one of free trade becoming more acceptable
as a general policy, and countries, in most
other respects aiming at their own self-
aggrandizement, embraced the concept. This,
then, is in contrast to the other 19th century
periods, which both were, for a considerable
extent of time, markedly inner- or intra-bloc-
oriented.
For the 20th century the inconsistencies
are few but still obvious. First, the 1933-1944
period showed less solidification of opposing
blocs than could be expected. Secondly, the
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period 1963-1976 saw a notable lack of the
loosening of blocs that previously had been
associated with universalist patterns, and most
markedly, a failure to curtail the arms build-
up and accept internal dissent.
Looking over the entire period, most of these
inconsistencies refer to the Realpolitik domain;
the alliances and the armaments do not
correspond with the message from other
policies. In Geopolitik terms, the consistency
is fairly complete (with some exceptions as
to buffer zone policies), as is also the case
for Idealpolitik, and Kapitalpolitik (with the
exceptions of the 19th century pointed to).
In one period the Realpolitik divergence goes
in a universalist direction, perhaps influencing
the major wars of the period to become
shorter (1849-1870). In another period the
outcome might well have been the reverse,
meaning the abandoning of universalist policies
altogether (1963-1976).
Consistency would, in particular, have the
effect of reducing uncertainty among the major
powers. Given that these powers have a fairly
uniform understanding of the dimensions
involved, consistency would reinforce a given
message. Thus, at times some inconsistency
might have been less important, notably the
lack of correspondence of Kapitalpolitik
policies with other elements in the 19th century.
In the 20th century, however, Kapitalpolitik
might have been more important. With such
an understanding it becomes clear that all
universalist periods are highly internally
consistent, with one exception, 1963-1976.
Also, on the whole, all the 20th century
particularist periods are highly consistent.
Of the latter, two ended in world wars, and
one in a crisis that might well have resulted
in the third one.
Inconsistency could give rise to a demand
for change, consistency being a more preferable
condition. Thus, a given period could change
into its opposite. But change would also have
other roots and to these we now turn.
4. From Universalism to particularism, and
vice-versa
Although the universalist policies have largely
been consistent and not resulted in major
war, they were all abandoned. Obviously, the
policies pursued were not satisfactory to all
involved. This means that they were built on
a foundation that was solid enough for a certain
period of time, but not solid enough to handle
particular changes.
Also the conditions that brought about the
universalist periods in the first place should
be considered, as this might suggest the outer
limits of the policies. Thus, there are two
particular points of change that need to be
scrutinized: the change from universalism to
particularism and changes in the opposite
direction.
Such changes could be sought in three
particular areas:
1. Changes among the majors: the composition
of their relationships, relative capabilities,
but also inconsistency in policy.
2. Changes involving the minors: their
direct relations to the majors, degree of
independence, etc.
3. Internal changes in the different actors,
notably in the majors: revolutions, change
of perspectives.
Altogether, there are six shifts to consider,
three in each direction. In all cases, the years
of change have been identified and factors
mentioned by historians as influential have
been collected. Some typical variables are
presented in Table IV.
Although Table IV indicates dates for
changes, such dates of course are but symbolic;
changes are always the result of long-term
trends. Some of the changes, consequently,
are harder to locate exactly in time. However,
dates are important for understanding charge;
their symbolic value is highly educational.
First, the transformation from universalism
to particularism is comparatively non-violent;
there are some wars recorded, but no sharp
change is evident in the power relationships
between the leading actors. The wars at the
time were those of major powers solidifying
their position by attacking minors (e.g. Prussia
on Denmark, Japan on China, the United States
on Spain), but such wars are hardly novel or
directly related to the shifts. More interesting,
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Table IV. Factors Affecting Change in Policy Pattern
and more frequently emphasized by historians,
are the internal changes within major powers.
The revolutions in France, Austria and Germany
are related to the breakdown of the existing
order. In the first two cases, revolution brought
back a Napoleon and brought down a Metter-
nich, in the third case it overthrew the Weimar
Republic and created the Third Reich. These
changes were not ordinary domestic shifts of
power, as the internal orders were integral
parts of the entire international arrangement
at the time. Consequently, these revolutions
were as much challenges to predominant
universalism as to the internal order. With
Louis Philippe and the Weimar Republic
removed, not only were symbols of the
previous order replaced, but something more
fundamental had changed; the role of these
countries as majors were redefined. The shifts
in 1848/1849 and 1932/1933 could both be
seen this way.
The third change away from universalism
is more difficult to analyse. The shifts around
the turn of the century resulting in the con-
frontation patterns leading to World War I
were more gradual. There is no particular
revolution to point to. Instead factors such as
the removal of Bismarck from power in
Germany, the realignment among European
powers, the decreasing number of territories
available to territory-seeking European
countries and the emergence of non-European
major states seem important.
However, the parallel between the changes
in 1848/1849 and those of 1932/1933 might
still permit a more general conclusion; the
revolutionary changes were related to economic
crisis, uneven development of industry,
unemployment, and, thus, to protest and
radicalism (’leftist’ as well as ’rightist’, and in
both situations ’rightists’ coming out on the
top). The regimes that were overthrown were
closely identified with the previous ’world
order’ either in personal capacity or in (close
to) legal terms. This close association between
the internal and international arrangement
led to the downfall of both.
Possibly, we can specify a chain of events
that is potentially very destabilizing for a
given international arrangement; economic
mismanagement and reduced popular support
for a regime whose role is highly significant
for universalist policies will endanger not
only these regimes, but, very likely, also upset
the entire policy. In other words, a weakness
of these universalist policies might have been
their excessive reliance on the maintenance
of a particular order in particular countries.
The policies were, in a sense, not adaptive
enough to handle the internal changes of
leading and crucial states. Indeed, the policies
of appeasement, pursued during the 1930s,
rested on the assumption that adaptation was
possible, and that, at a given moment,
Germany’s ambitions could be satisfied,
preserving most of the League arrangement.
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The challenge to the entire Versailles con-
struction was only understood at a very late
moment. Such a policy of adaptation is, in
other words, not likely to be successful if/
when the entire international arrangement
is the matter of dispute. The only alternative
might be a policy of ’pre-emptive’ adaptation
to defuse tensions when they are still latent.
However, to change an already existing
arrangement before it has become an issue
will mostly not have sufficient political
support. Politics seem to require much more
concrete signals of warnings.
The changes in the mid-1890s followed
a slightly different logic. There were no
internal revolutions, but the interaction
between inter-state relations and internal
politics was still there. The removal of Bismarck
suggested that Germany’s role in the world
could be seen in a different light by Germany
as well as by others, notably Russia. The
rapid colonization meant that there were fewer
distant territories to struggle for. Together
these factors might have contributed to making
Germany take a stronger, less compromising
stand.1«
Turning to the transformation from
particularism to universalism, we find more
violent change, and at that, among the majors
themselves. Two of the shifts are multi-
dimensional, and relate to two major wars:
1870/1871 and 1918/1919. These changes are,
however, not ordinary major power defeats;
the era investigated has seen a number of such
defeats (e.g. Russia in the Crimean war or in
the Russo-Japanese war). In addition they
involves - considerable internal changes. New
regimes and new constitutions were developed
in France and Germany, respectively. The new
orders created were not simply rearrangements
of inter-state relations. Rather, the three
universalist periods following a major war
(including, for the sake of the argument, 1814,
as well as 1871 and 1919) are parallel; they
aimed not only at containing a given major
power but also at reducing the perceived
threat of certain types of internal policies.
Thus, universalism became linked to particular
regimes.. In post-Napoleonic France, as well
as in the Weimar Republic, these new regimes
became identified with the defeat. This seems,
however, not to have been the case for the
post-1871 Third Republic.
As was the case with transformations away
from universalism, there is one case which
is less clear-cut. It is comparable to the 1895/
1896 shift but the direction is the opposite
one: 1962/1963. There can be no doubt that
the policy of detente, introduced in the
immediate aftermath of the 1962 nuclear
confrontation between the United States and
the Soviet Union, reflected a fear of a nuclear
war between the two. Also, at this time,
increased attention was given to Third World
problems (the United States becoming in-
creasingly involved in the Vietnam war, the
Soviet Union extending support to liberation
movements throughout the Third World). The
process of decolonization created a new area
for the leading majors, the year 1960 and
the Congo crisis being symbolic. Thus, the
universalism introduced and pursued until
the end of the 1970s seems to have had a double
origin: fear of nuclear war and focus on Third
World activities.
This means that the policy of detente had
a different origin than the other universalist
policies encountered in this analysis; it was
not a matter of victors setting up a system
to be preserved against others, but rather
of the competitors trying to preserve themselves
against a possible catastrophe. Nuclear
weapons, in other words, changed the dynamics
of relations between the major powers. In one
sense, this was a profound change; it meant
that anticipation of devastation was brought
into the calculations before devastation actually
took place. In another sense, it was less
profound; the consensus among the majors
was less developed than was the case in earlier
universalist periods. An argument could still
be made in favor of confrontation, brinkman-
ship, in order to continue the battle between
the majors. Unlike the other situations, there
was no reordering of priorities; rather a policy
of caution succeeded a policy of boldness.
In this vein, the shift in 1962/1963 is comparable
to the one of 1895/1896: no change in basic
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goals or basic perception of incompatibility,
but a change in the means to be used. Wilhelm
II grasped for vigor, Kennedy/Khrushchev
for caution; Wilhelm was in a hurry to arrive
at final victory, Kennedy/Khrushchev settled
down to wait for the ultimate collapse of the
other, either from internal contradictions
or from changes in global relationships.
In 1895/1896 the lack of ’empty’ territory
meant that the conflict had to be pursued
in more vital (to the majors) areas, in 1962/
1963 the ’opening up’ of new territory through
decolonization meant that the same conflict
could be pursued in less vital areas. Either
way, the armament build-up received new
stimuli.
This, in other words, suggests a possible
link between ’central’ and ’peripheral’ areas,
the one replacing the other as a forum for
continued confrontation between major powers
having defined themselves in incompatibility
with one another. In general terms, such
incompatibilities can either end in major wars
(as indeed has been the outcome for two
periods of particularism, as shown above) or
internal revolutions (as indeed has been the
outcome for two periods of universalism), or
in a continous shift between ’arenas’ of
competition, as long as such arenas exist
(as happened in the two remaining trans-
formations). In the latter case, this means
that ’peripheral’ areas are ’outlets’ for major
powers, striving to gain a leverage on the other,
but hoping to manage this without a direct
onslaught.
A final note: 1976 is here, as a matter of
convenience and availability of data, regarded
as the ending of one universalist period. In
retrospect, it appears correct to suggest that
detente gradually thinned out beginning at
approximately this time, culminating with the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the
election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. Seen in this
light, it is interesting to relate some of our
previous findings to this development. Neither
in terms of Idealpolitik nor Kapitalpolitik are
there any important changes among or within
the major powers. In Realpolitik terms there
are some changes: a new actor entering more
actively, China, during these years of transition
forming new relations with the West. Also,
there is a set of new challenges emerging from
the Third World: the oil crisis and rising
Islamic fundamentalism, the latter resulting
in confrontation with both superpowers
(in Iran and Afghanistan, respectively).
A criterion for success for detente might have
been the ability of the United States and
the Soviet Union to win Third World support,
but these developments were set-backs, for both.
Thus, there is a parallel between this transition
and the one in 1895/1896. Failure in promoting
success in distant areas (from the point of view
of the major powers) tends to result in increasing
tension in the central arena. To this, then, should
be added the obvious inconsistencies in the
policies of detente, pointed to in the previous
section, primarily the failure to control the
arms race.
5. Limits of major power universalism
Major powers have continuously tried to work
out constructive relations among themselves.
Such attempts have, in some periods, lasted
for a considerable period of time. The record
suggests that the pursuit of such universalist
policies is associated with fewer wars and
confrontations in general and among the major
powers in particular. Such policies have served
at the same time to maintain the indepcndence
of the majors and reduce the dangers of war
among them. Invariably, however, they have
been superseded by periods of particularism,
when one or several of the majors have
embarked on policies advancing the particular
interest, rather than the joint interest of all.
Such periods are associated with higher levels
of war and confrontations among the majors.
In several instances they have resulted in
the dismemberment or defeat of one or several
of the majors. Invariably, such periods have
been followed by universalist policies.
Looking at the four concerted attempts of
universalism in the 1816-1976 period, they
display some discernable common traits.
First, they have been arrangements worked
out among major powers, normally the victors
in a previous war: the Concert of Europe,
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Bismarck’s order and the League of Nations
all followed immediately on major wars. Thus,
they represented attempts by the victors to
handle their victory, to avoid the reemergence
of threat from the losers. The detente period
differs, but in some respect it could be seen
as a belated attempt among the victors to
agree on a set of relations, in particular for
Europe. More directly, however, it attempted
to stabilize the relations between the majors
themselves in the face of a mutual nuclear
threat. The three first examples of universalist
policies, consequently, built on a much more
developed common interest than did the period
of detente. In the former situations, the
victors had a clear actor to worry about, in
the latter case, the fear came primarily from
the other party or from the general threat of
nuclear war. There was, consequently, less of
an incentive to solve conflict in the latter case.
The focus was more on avoiding escalation than
on conflict settlement.
Second, all these arrangements have been
conservative as they have tried to stabilize the
status quo: maintaining the major powers as
majors, keeping the existing power relationships
among them and upholding the distance to non-
majors. In the face of challenges, the policy
has been one of adaptation, trying to make the
challenges fit within the existing framework,
rather than substantially alter the framework
itself. The duration of some of the periods
of universalism indicates that this sometimes
has been possible: confrontations among
majors have been resolved without escalation
to war. However, the conservative nature
obviously has some short-comings, as there
are many challenges which are less easily
accommodated.
Thirdly, the consistency across several
dimensions of policy have been marked for
most of the periods, except most notably
for the detente period. This internal consistency
might well have contributed to reducing
uncertainty and thus to make actions and
reactions more predictable. Such more
predictable relations, it could be argued,
would reduce the emergence of conflict in
the first place. An indication of this is that
the number of wars and confrontations with
major powers involved per year is much lower
for the periods of consistent universalism
than for the period of detente.l
Fourthly, all universalist periods witnessed
a shift in focus away from direct major-major
confrontations in central areas to a preoccupa-
tion with major-minor relations. Most
markedly this is true for the Concert of Europe,
Bismarckian and detente periods. This diversion
of attention could deflect some of the tension
in the central areas and point to common
interests in other areas. Inevitably, however,
it means that the universalist policies become
dependent on the degree of success in that
field, resulting in interventionism. For both
the Bismarckian and detente period, frustra-
tions in these respects seem to have made the
powers turn to the central area again. If that
is where the origin of conflict is, this can be
seen as logic within this framework. In both
these cases it resulted in an intensification
of arms build-ups and increasingly unpredictive
major power relations.
Fifth, the universalist policies have not
simply been an arrangement built among states.
There has also been a significant internal
component to them. In the cases where victors
worked out an order for the post-war period,
new regimes have been installed in the defeated
countries. These regimes have been the
ultimate guarantors of the new order, meaning
that the orders become vulnerable to the
efficacy of these regimes. Internal .change
in such countries becomes directly relevant
to international relations.. Thus, French
reconstruction in 1815 and the German Weimar
Republic had to carry a double burden of
confirming the defeat and reconstructing
their countries. In the end neither succeeded.
Most notable, however, is the fact that the
Third Republic was not, in the same way,
identified with the war defeat. In somewhat
the same way, the new German governments
after 1949 have been absolved of the misdeeds
of their predecessors.l2
Major power universalism has been highly
constrained. Most markedly this appears true
for the most recent attempt, the period of
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detente. It could not build on the power of
united victors, it failed to be consistent across
significant dimensions and ultimately internal
inconsistencies brought it down. The question,
then, arises if there is an alternative to such
universalist policies.
This analysis suggest some principles for an
alternative form of universalism, making it
possible to break out of some of the historically
observed constraints:
- a greater involvement of non-major powers
in questions of world peace and security,
- a greater openness, on the part of the
major powers, to change in non-major
countries and in relations among states,
- a greater consistency in major power
relations, particularly in the fields of
disengagement, disarmament and dis-
sensus,
- a greater restraint on permissible behavior
of major powers in Third World conflicts,
- a greater domestic accountability for the
foreign policies of major powers,
- and breaking out of the framework:
- a greater reliance on non-governmental
organizations.
These principles would serve to make
universalism truly universal, not simply the
universalism of major powers.
NOTES
1. Universalism and particularism as defined by
Parsons focuses on norms rather than actions.
Still the concepts are useful as they point to the
general rather than the specific as the center of
attention. (See Parsons & Shils 1951, p. 82).
2. Most definitions of world order are multi-
dimensional. Falk & Mendlovitz find world order
to be the answer to questions of worldwide
economic welfare, social justice, ecological stability
as well as to reduction of international violence.
(See Falk & Mendlovitz 1973, p. 6.) A broad and
most stimulating contribution is Falk (1975).
Hoffman (1980, p. 188) also gives a very broad
definition of the concept of world order, as a
state in which violence and economic disruptions
have been ’tamed’, ’moderation’ has emerged,
economies progress and collective institutions
act. The concept of Common Security, introduced
in the so-called Palme Commission, involved a
conception similar to the one of Hoffmann. (See
Common Security, 1982.)
3. Thus we attempt to describe dominant traits in
the major power relations during these periods.
A most interesting contribution in the same
direction is Rosecrance (1963). Recently, the
interest in long waves has resulted in similar
generalizations for particular periods, mostly
focusing economic variables. A contribution
pertinent to the present discussion is V&auml;yrynen
(1983).
4. Such wars have come at earliest in the sixth year
of particularist policy: the Krimean War in 1854, the
Russo-Japanese War in 1938 (Changkufeng War)
and the Korean War in 1950, all within this range,
the Russo-Japanese war of 1904 being somewhat
later. This list, furthermore, suggests that such
first major-major wars occur in areas fairly distant
from the main major power area of contention
(at all these times being Europe). For data, see
Small & Singer (1982).
5. This distinction, built on the basic arguments in
different schools of thinking, is elaborated in
Wallensteen (1981).
6. The lack of disengagement in German-French
relations following the war of 1871 is often pointed
to by historians. The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine
became a humiliating experience for the French,
although the military value of the area to either
party could be disputed. Thus, no buffers were
created between the two, making the relations
tense. A result of this was the War Scare of 1875.
See Kennan (1979, pp. 11-23). For a general discussion,
see Patem (1983).
7. For an overview of the development of arms
expenditure for these periods, see Nincic (1982). For
an overview of the nuclear arsenals, drawn from
several sources, see Botnen (1982) and SIPRI (1983).
The total nuclear arsenals are estimated at 1000 in
1952, 23,500 in 1960, 35,500 in 1970 and 48,800
in 1975.
9. Reporting to the US Congress on his visit to
Moscow in 1972 Nixon summarized this policy as
one of ’creating a momentum of achievement
in which progress in one area could contribute
to progress in others’, and ’when the two largest
economies in the world start trading with each
other on a much larger scale, living standards in
both nations will rise, and the stake which both
have in peace will increase’. Cooperation in space
exploration was also part of this, resulting in
a joint orbital mission in 1975. See ’Address by
President Nixon to a Joint Session of the Congress’,
June 1, 1972 in Stebbins & Adams (1976, pp. 80-81).
The resulting space mission was in 1975 hailed by
Le Canard Enchain&eacute;: Vive La Coexistence
Espacifique!
10. Such links form some of the conclusions in
Choucri & North (1975, ch. 16). On the significance
of Bismarck’s departure, see Kennan, op.cit.
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11. The average annual major power involvement
in war or confrontation is, for 1816-1848 1.0, for
1871-1895 0.9, for 1919-1932 1.7 and for 1963-1976
2.2. The latter figure actually puts the detente
period parallel to some of the particularist periods,
notably the 1896-1918 period with 2.3 and 1933-
1944 with 2.2.
12. The significance of the German question is given
an extensive and interesting treatment in DePorte
(1979).
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